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Abstract
As online ad offerings become increasingly complex, with multiple size configurations and
layouts available to advertisers, the sale of web advertising space increasingly resembles a com-
binatorial auction with complementarities. Standard ad auction formats do not immediately
extend to these settings, and truthful combinatorial auctions, such as the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves
auction, can yield unacceptably low revenue. Core selecting auctions, which apply to combinato-
rial markets, boost revenue by setting prices so that no group of agents, including the auctioneer,
can jointly improve their utilities by switching to a different allocation and payments. Among
outcomes in the core, bidder-optimal core points have been the most widely studied due to their
incentive properties, such as being implementable at equilibrium. Prior work in economics has
studied heuristics and algorithms for computing approximate bidder-optimal core points given
oracle access to the welfare optimization problem, but these solutions either lack performance
guarantees or are based on prohibitively slow convex programs. Our main result is a combina-
torial algorithm that finds an approximate bidder-optimal core point with almost linear number
of calls to the welfare maximization oracle. Our algorithm is faster than previously-proposed
heuristics, it has theoretical guarantees, and it reveals some useful structural properties of the
core polytope. We conclude that core pricing is implementable even for very time sensitive
practical use cases such as realtime auctions for online advertising and can yield more revenue.
We justify this claim experimentally using the Microsoft Bing Ad Auction platform, which al-
lows advertisers to have decorations with a non-uniform number of lines of text. We find that
core pricing generates almost 100% more revenue than VCG on average, and almost 20% more
revenue than the standard Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction.
1 Introduction
Auctions with combinatorial preferences are prevalent in practice. One prominent example is the
sale of online advertising space, where companies with ads of various shapes, configurations, and
decoration options have combinatorial and potentially complementary preferences over ad space
on search engines. In sponsored search, rich advertisements can include site links, pictures, and
many other decorations that result in an advertiser having several possible ads with varying sizes
(i.e., that take up a different number of lines). The platforms selling the ad space use auctions to
determine which ads will appear where, and at what price. As more advertising options become
available, these ad auctions must likewise be extended to effectively allocate and price the possible
outcomes. Standard solutions for simple matching markets, such as the Generalized Second Price
(GSP) auction, are typically ill-defined in combinatorial markets, and common hacks used in the
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industry (such as updating click rates and space constraints but otherwise disregarding ad size)
lack economic grounding.
We instead consider combinatorial auctions for the sale of space problem. There are many
potential auction formats for combinatorial markets, among which there are two of particular
note: Vickrey-Clark-Groves (VCG) auctions and core-selecting auctions. These auctions are direct
revelation mechanisms, that is, they ask bidders to report their preferences over bundles of items
and then compute an allocation and payments as a function of these reports. Both auctions
select the optimal welfare allocation, i.e., the one with the maximum total value for the bidders.
Optimizing welfare is a computationally hard problem in many cases of interest, and this issue
has drawn considerable attention from the algorithmic game theory community. However, even in
settings where this difficulty can be resolved satisfactorily (e.g., via heuristics that have exponential
runtime in the worst case but tend to solve practical instances quickly), this still leaves the problem
of computing the payments.
In VCG autions, the payment of a bidder is, intuitively, the externality that he imposes on
the other bidders by consuming the resources allocated to him. While rarely used in practice
Ausubel and Milgrom (2006), this auction is a useful point of comparison as it has several important
theoretical properties. First, among welfare-maximizing auction formats, it is the unique payment
rule (up to additive offsets) that incentivizes truthtelling as a dominant strategy on the part of
the bidders. Second, given access to an oracle which computes the optimal welfare allocation, it is
computationally efficient: it takes just n + 1 oracle calls to compute the outcome (allocation and
payments).
Unfortunately, in the presence of complementarities, the revenue generated by VCG can be
quite low compared to the bidders’ values, and the resulting outcome can seem unfair. Consider,
for example, a setting with two items, A and B, and three bidders, 1, 2, and 3. Suppose bidder 1
only wants item A and has a value of $100 for it. Similarly, bidder 2 only wants item B and also
has a value of $100 for it. Bidder 3 has complementary preferences. He only wants both A and B
and has a value of $101 for this bundle. In this setting, the VCG auction gives item A to bidder
1 and item B to bidder 2 and charges each of them a price of $1 for a total revenue of $2. This
revenue is both low compared to the values, and also seemingly unfair from the point of bidder 3
who would be willing to pay quite a bit more than the winners.
Core-selecting auctions attempt to address both the revenue and fairness issues of VCG while
retaining welfare optimality and minimally sacrificing the incentives. They again choose an optimal
welfare allocation, but then set payments such that no group of bidders, including the auctioneer,
can simultaneously improve outcomes by switching to a different allocation and payments. In the
above example, if the bidders bid their true values, then any set of payments such that bidders 1 and
2 jointly pay at least $101 while each paying at most $100 could be the outcome of a core-selecting
auction.
Core-selecting auctions are not truthful in the sense of dominant strategies, but they have natu-
ral equilibria that generate welfare-optimal outcomes Day and Raghavan (2007); Day and Milgrom
(2008). Most of the work on core-selecting auctions has focused on bidder-optimal payments, which
have the property that it is not possible to reduce any bidder’s payment and remain in the core.
In the above example, having each of bidders 1 and 2 pay $100 is a core outcome, but is not
bidder-optimal; having bidder 1 pay $50 and bidder 2 pay $51 is bidder-optimal. Bidder-optimal
core payments have additional desirable incentive properties; see Day and Raghavan (2007) and
Day and Cramton (2012) for a discussion. As a result, they have been used in practice to sell
wireless spectra Cramton (2013) and have more recently been proposed for use in selling online
advertising Day and Milgrom (2008); Goel et al. (2015), in particular when ads have decorations.
However, to be truly practical for large frequent auctions like online advertising, an auction must
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be (1) highly computationally efficient, (2) simple enough to be implemented, and (3) combinato-
rially structured to be generalizable for different economic objectives. As core-selecting auctions
output optimal-welfare allocations, the computation associated with finding such allocations is
unavoidable. Moreover, in practice and in particular for the application of sale of ad-space, the
combinatorial problem is typically structured so that it is possible to compute welfare-optimal (or
near-optimal) allocations quickly for realistic preferences. In fact, as we elaborate more later in the
experimental section, bidding languages commonly used in practice for sponsored ad space express
preferences for which one can compute (near) optimal outcomes. The main issue we tackle in this
paper is the additional difficulty of computing bidder-optimal core payments, given a satisfactory
solution to the welfare optimization problem.
To make this separation clear, we follow the core auction literature and assume oracle access
to a welfare optimization algorithm. We note that such an oracle should handle not only subsets
of the original valuation profile, but also truncations in which each bidder’s value for each bundle
is shifted by an additive offset. It is important to mention that while this oracle might be as
computationally tractable as the welfare-optimization oracle on the original valuation profile, such
as in ad auctions with simple bidding languages (see Section 5), they can potentially impose further
computational challenges. Nevertheless, this form of welfare optimization is common in the core
auction literature Ausubel and Milgrom (2002); Day and Cramton (2012), and can be viewed as
bidding strategies that target a certain amount of utility Hoy et al. (2013). Prior work on core
payments assumes access to such an oracle and computes core outcomes using either heuristics Day
and Milgrom (2008); Day and Raghavan (2007); Erdil and Klemperer (2010); Bünz et al. (2015)
or computationally intensive convex programming methods Day and Cramton (2012); Day and
Raghavan (2007).
1.1 Main results
Our approach is two-fold. We consider both a theoretical treatment of the problem of finding a
bidder-optimal core point (Sections 3 and 4), and also an experimental treatment of deploying our
algorithm in the highly time sensitive rich sponsored ad-auction platforms, i.e. sale of ad-space
(Section 5). For the latter, we use Microsoft Bing Ad Auction models and data.
Theoretical results Our main result is a quasi-linear time deterministic algorithm for computing
bidder-optimal core payments, given access to an oracle that finds a welfare-optimal allocation for
a (particularly modified) profile of buyer valuations. The algorithm is simple and reveals some
specific geometric structures of the core pricing polytope.
Theorem (informal): Given oracle access to a welfare-optimization algorithm (for truncated
values), there exists a deterministic algorithm that computes an -approximate bidder optimal core
point using O(n log(n/)) oracle evaluations and additional time O(n2 log(n/)).
Our algorithm proceeds by making multiple calls to the welfare-optimization oracle with poten-
tially truncated valuations, as discussed above. The set of core utilities is a polytope, determined
by the (exponentially many) constraints that no subset of bidders can simultaneously improve their
utilities. Intuitively, the algorithm proceeds by exploring this polytope. Starting from an arbitrary
point in the core, the algorithm attempts to increase bidder utilities, which corresponds geometri-
cally to following a positively-oriented ray until hitting a facet of the polytope. It then determines
whether there exists a subset of the bidders whose utilities can be increased while remaining in the
core, and if so continues to follow an appropriate ray. This process repeats until a bidder-optimal
core point is reached.
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This geometric intuition corresponds to a water-filling algorithm, in which the utilities of agents
are simultaneously increased and frozen as constraints become tight. Implementing this approach
requires an efficient test for inclusion in the core polytope, as well as a method for determining which
bidders are involved in a tight core constraint. It turns out that both questions can be expressed
as queries to the welfare-optimization oracle, with appropriately truncated valuation profiles. This
result is the most technical contribution of the paper, and involves an analysis of the geometry of
the core constraints. This result is naturally related to the well-known equivalence of optimization
and separation, and indeed one can interpret our results as exploiting the geometry of the core to
implement and employ a specially-tailored separation oracle. Given these tests, finding a tight core
constraint can be done using binary search (which is what generates the logarithmic factors in our
runtime). The algorithm terminates after at most n iterations, since each iteration will freeze the
payment of at least one bidder.
Compared to the VCG auction, our algorithm finds payments nearly as quickly (specifically,
with only a logarithmic factor more oracle calls), and produces higher revenue and a more fair
outcome on the same profile of bids. But as bidders are strategic, any comparison must consider
the outcomes at equilibria of the auctions. The computational properties are worst-case and hence
do not degrade with strategic play. But what about the welfare, revenue, and fairness properties?
As we discuss in Section 4, our auction has a natural -Nash equilibrium in which players play
truncation strategies (i.e., shave all values by an additive constant). This equilibrium is welfare-
optimal and has higher revenue than VCG’s dominant strategy equilibrium. Furthermore, by
varying the direction of binary search in the core polytope, our algorithm can be parameterized to
favor different core outcomes. For example, we can maximize the minimum utility enjoyed by any
winner (subject to being in the core), or we can attempt to equalize, across all winners, the ratio
between their utility and the utility they would obtain in the VCG outcome.
Experimental results. We test the performance of our core auctions on text ads using the Mi-
crosoft Bing search engine. Our dataset consists of around 20, 000 auctions, each auction containing
at most 23 advertisers, with configurations ranging from the basic three lines up to fourteen lines.
We compare the performance of our core auction against VCG and GSP. As mentioned earlier, GSP
is technically ill-defined in such combinatorial settings. We therefore consider an implementation
of GSP that generates the optimal allocation and charges each ad a price equal to the bid of the
next ad in the ordering.1 Our results show that, due to the complementarity of valuations induced
by variable length ads, VCG and GSP can lead to significantly lower revenue than core auctions.
Our bidder optimal core outcome leads to almost 100% more revenue than VCG and almost 20%
more revenue than GSP in our dataset, on average. All three algorithms require an allocation
oracle. We chose to implement an optimal oracle which, in our setting, has a run time polynomial
in the number of ads and amount of ad space. In our experiments, for ad space with 20 lines,
our algorithm, which makes O˜(n) calls to this oracle, ran in under 55 milliseconds per auction,
compared to 11 milliseconds for VCG (which makes n+ 1 calls to the oracle) and 3 milliseconds for
GSP (which makes a single call to the oracle). While being slower than GSP and VCG, our auction
still is faster than blackbox linear programming or running sophisticated iterative heuristics, and
it is still in the acceptable speed range for ad-auctions.
1We also tested a variant of GSP that uses a greedy allocation, rather than the optimal slate, but this was
outperformed by the welfare-optimizing version.
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1.2 Related work
The VCG mechanism is a prevalent auction for combinatorial settings (for primary sources see Vick-
rey (1961); Clarke (1971); Groves (1973)), but it is rarely used in practice due to practical issues,
including its potentially low revenue; e.g. see Ausubel and Milgrom (2002, 2006) for a survey. The
ascending proxy auction was one auction proposed by Ausubel and Milgrom (2002) as a practical
alternative that resolves some of these issues. This ascending auction terminates at a desirable
“bidder Pareto-optimal core outcome." This line of research was further developed by Day and
Raghavan (2007); Day and Milgrom (2008, 2010); Day and Cramton (2012) by considering the
general notion of core-selecting package auctions, and identifying incentive properties of Pareto
optimal frontier of core polytope, as well as revenue advantages of core auctions.
Pareto bidder optimal core outcomes are implementable at equilibrium, but are not truthful.
Payment rules that pick particular points in the core have been proposed in the literature to
mitigate this issue. For example, the difference between a final payment and the VCG payment
represents a measure of “residual incentive to misreport,” as observed by Parkes et al. (2001). Day
and Raghavan (2007) therefore proposed the minimum-revenue point and Day and Cramton (2012)
proposed the closest-to-VCG point, which are the Pareto optimal core points that minimize `1-norm
and `2-norm of this difference respectively. An alternative practical core payment rule proposed by
Erdil and Klemperer (2010) considers robustness with respect to the submitted bids.
As discussed above, computing core points is at least as hard as a particular winner deter-
mination problem, which is effectively a separation oracle for the core polytope by inputing the
truncated values Day and Cramton (2012). One can therefore optimize convex objectives over core
polytope using the Ellipsoid algorithm Grötschel et al. (1981), but this is rather slow in practice.
Various heuristic algorithms have been proposed for linear objectives of revenue (i.e., the Core
Constraint Generation algorithm) Day and Raghavan (2007); Bünz et al. (2015), or the quadratic
objective of distance to VCG Day and Cramton (2012); Erdil and Klemperer (2010) to address this
issue. Another approach is using the recent fast cutting-plane methods for the feasibility linear
programs of Lee et al. (2015) in a black-box fashion, given access to the core separation oracle
(i.e. welfare optimization for truncated values). One can apply this method to minimize the lin-
ear objective of revenue (which leads to a bidder-optimal core point Day and Raghavan (2007)),
obtaining an -approximation with high probability, using O(n(1+) logO(1)(n/)) oracle evaluations
in expectation and additional time O(n3 logO(1)(n/)). Relative to this (more general) approach,
our solution (1) requires asymptotically fewer oracle calls and less additional time, and (2) is deter-
ministic, which is advantageous for the incentive and equilibrium properties of bidder optimal core
points. These issues highlight the advantages of our proposed pricing algorithm, and in particular
its practicality as an sponsored search auction.
Numerous works have proposed core auctions specifically to address known drawbacks of VCG
auctions. The Bayesian setting was studied by Ausubel and Baranov (2010), and more recently
by Sano (2012) and Goeree and Lien (2016), providing theoretical and experimental evidence that
the revenues and efficiency from core-selecting auctions improve as correlations among bidders’
values increase, while the revenues from the VCG auction worsen. Another issue with VCG is the
lack of revenue monotonicity: adding bidders or increasing bids can potentially decrease the seller’s
revenue Goel and Khani (2014); Lamy (2010); Rastegari et al. (2011); Beck and Ott (2009). Beck
and Ott (2009) and Lamy (2010) proposed revenue-monotone core selection.
Sponsored search has been a central research topic for econ/cs in the past decade Edelman et al.
(2007). The closest in the literature to our sale of ad space application is the recent work of Cavallo
et al. (2017) that considered the algorithmic question of finding allocation and pricing for rich ads,
but did not study core pricing specifically.
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2 Preliminaries
We will describe our algorithm and theoretical results in a general model of combinatorial auctions,
then return to a restricted model tailored to the ad auction setting in Section 5. We consider a
combinatorial auction setting with n bidders andm items. Let N be the set of bidders. The auction
asks each bidder to declare a valuation function, which assigns a value to each subset of the items.
We will write bi for the valuation function submitted by agent i. We will assume that valuation
functions are normalized so that bi(∅) = 0, and all values are scaled to lie in [0, 1]. An allocation is
an assignment of item bundles to agents, {xi}i∈N , such that xi ∩ xj = ∅ for all i 6= j.
Given the bid functions {bi}i∈N , the auction will return an outcome, consisting of an allocation
{xi}i∈N and a payment pi ≥ 0 for each bidder. We will tend to write pii for the resulting utility2 for
bidder i, so that pii = bi(xi)− pi. We write pi0 for the seller’s revenue. Throughout this paper, we
assume that the auction’s allocation rule does not allocate sets of zero value. We say that a feasible
allocation {x∗i }i∈N is welfare-maximizing if and only if {x∗i }i∈N ∈ argmax
x:xi∩xj=∅,i 6=j
∑
i∈N bi(xi). For any
feasible allocation {xi}i∈N , let W ({xi}i∈N ) , {i ∈ N : xi 6= ∅} be the corresponding winner set.
Let w(S, {bi(.)}i∈N ) be the maximum welfare of coalition S with respect to the bids {bi}. That is,
w(S, {bi(.)}i∈N ) is the maximum welfare of any allocation that assigns items only to agents in S.
Unless noted otherwise, we will write w(S) , w(S, {bi(.)}i∈N ) for notational convenience.
Definition 2.1 (Winner Set). A subset W ⊆ N of bidders is a winner set with respect to bids
{bi(.)}i∈N if and only if there exists a feasible allocation {x∗i }i∈N such that
{x∗i }i∈N ∈ argmax
x:xi∩xj=∅,i 6=j
∑
i∈N
bi(xi) (1)
and W = {i ∈ N : x∗i 6= ∅}. Let W({bi(.)}i∈N ) be the set of winner sets with respect to {bi(.)}i∈N .
Definition 2.2 (Core). A vector of non-negative utilities {pii}i∈N∪{0} is said to be in the core with
respect to the submitted bids {bi(.)}i∈N if no blocking coalition exists,3 i.e.,
∀S ⊆ N : pi0 ≥ w(S)−
∑
i∈S
pii. (2)
Similarly, an outcome {(xi, pi)}i∈N is said to be in the core if its corresponding vector of utilities
(i.e. ∀i ∈ N : pii = bi(xi)− pi and pi0 = ∑i∈N pi) is in the core.
It is easy to see that any core outcome {(xi, pi)}i∈N is welfare-maximizing, as for coalition N
we have ∑i∈N bi(xi) = pi0 +∑i∈N pii ≥ w(N). Therefore, one can rewrite Equation 2 as
∀S ⊆ N : w(N)−
∑
i∈N
pii ≥ w(S)−
∑
i∈S
pii. (3)
When clear from context, we will sometimes abuse notation slightly and use a set of bidders S to
denote the associated core constraint (3).
We have defined the core with respect to utilities and with respect to outcomes. The following
lemma shows that given a core point in utility space, it is possible to reconstruct core allocations
and payments. This motivates us to focus on the problem of computing core points in utility space.
2Since our focus is the computational problem of finding core payments, and not buyer incentives, we will not
differentiate between true and declared valuations in our notation. We abuse notation for convenience and define the
terms “utility” and “welfare” with respect to the declared bid functions. We discuss incentive issues in Section 4.
3That is, no group of bidders plus the seller can jointly deviate to simultaneously improve their outcomes, including
the seller’s revenue.
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Lemma 2.1. Given a core point {pii}i∈N and any maximum welfare allocation {x∗i }i∈N , let pi =
bi(x∗i )− pii for all i ∈ N . Then {(x∗i , p∗i )}i∈N will be an outcome in the core.
Proof By Definition 2.2, as long as payments are non-negative, we have the outcome {(x∗i , p∗i )}i∈N
to be in the core. So, we only need to show for every i ∈ N , pii ≤ bi(x∗i ). By looking at the core
constraint for coalition N \ {i}, we have:
w(N)−
∑
j∈N
pij ≥ w(N \ {i})−
∑
j∈N\{i}
pij ⇒
pii ≤ w(N)− w(N \ {i}) =
∑
j∈N
bj(x∗j )− w(N \ {i})
≤
∑
j∈N
bj(x∗j )−
∑
j∈N\{i}
bj(x∗j ) = bi(x∗i ).
where the last inequality holds as {x∗j}j∈N\{i} is a feasible allocation for bidders N \ {i}.
Our goal is to compute bidder optimal core points, i.e., points in the core that are not dominated by
any other point in the core with respect to bidder utilities. We will relax this condition by defining
-bidder optimal core points, i.e. core points that are -close to being bidder Pareto optimal.
Definition 2.3. A vector of utilities {pii}i∈N is said to be -bidder optimal for  > 0, if
• {pii}i∈N is in the core with respect to the submitted bids {bi(.)}i∈N , and
• there exists no other core point {pi′i}i∈N such that for every bidder i ∈ N , pi′i ≥ pii, and for at
least one bidder j, pi′j > pij + .
Similarly, an outcome {(xi, pi)}i∈N is said to be -bidder optimal if its corresponding vector of
utilities is -bidder optimal.
Observe that the set of core points forms a polytope in utility space, described by the (exponen-
tially many) constraints of the form (3). We are interested in identifying combinatorial structures
of the core polytope, in order to design a fast algorithm for finding a bidder optimal point. For
this purpose, as we will describe in more detail in later sections, it will be useful to find the core
constraint in Definition 2.2 whose right-hand side takes the maximum value. Therefore, we define
the notion of maximum binding core constraints.
Definition 2.4. Given a vector of utilities {pii}i∈N , a subset S ⊆ N is a Maximum Binding Core
Constraint (MBCC) if and only if S ∈ argmax
S′⊆N
w(S′)−
∑
i∈S′
pii.
Definition 2.5. Given a vector of utilities {pii}i∈N , a subset S ⊆ N is an -tight core constraint
(or a tight core constraint when  = 0) if and only if
w(S)−
∑
i∈S
pii ≤ w(N)−
∑
i∈N
pii ≤ w(S)−
∑
i∈S
pii + . (4)
3 The Water-Filling Algorithm
In brief, our algorithm is a water-filling method that starts from an arbitrary point in the core (e.g.,
pay-your-bid, where all agents receive utility 0) and then at each iteration does the following:
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• Finding a Feasible Direction: it first finds a subset of bidders such that if we increase all of
their utilities uniformly by a small amount, we still remain in the core.
• Uniform Utility Increase: It then increases the utilities for those bidders uniformly, until it
hits a facet of the core (approximately).
• Checking Termination Condition/Repeat: Finally, it checks whether there exists any remain-
ing subset of bidders who can increase their utilities and still remain in the core. If so, the
algorithm iterates. Otherwise it terminates.
See Figure 1 for an overview of the algorithm, and its geometric interpretation.
3.1 Winner Determination Oracle Model
In this paper, we focus on the winner determination oracle model as our model of computation.
More exactly, suppose we have access to a winner determination oracle under sincere strategies,
where a sincere strategy is a truncation of {bi(.)} by {pii}, i.e. {max(bi(.) − pii, 0)}. The oracle
accepts submitted bids and the required truncations as input, and then simulates truncated bids
to find a maximum welfare allocation. To make this more concrete, we define the oracle WIN-ORAC.
Definition 3.1. Let WIN-ORAC be a black-box oracle with this input-output relation:
• Input: submitted bids {bi(.)}i∈N and required truncations {pii}i∈N .
• Output: max welfare with truncated bids := w(N, {max(bi(.) − pii, 0)}i∈N ), and a winning
set, i.e. S ∈ W({max(bi(.)− pii, 0)}i∈N ) (or NULL if no such set exists).
3.2 The Algorithm
Here is the full description of our algorithm (Algorithm 1). It uses the subroutine Core-Search
at each iteration, which is basically binary-search to find the next feasible subset of dimensions
quickly, and it only requires O˜(1) number of calls to the oracle WIN-ORAC.
Algorithm 1 (Water-filling for finding an -bidder optimal core point)
1: parameters:  > 0.
2: input: submitted bids {bi(.)}, set of bidders N .
3: initialize: pi(0)i = 0 and p¯i
(0)
i = 0 for all i ∈ N . . utility vector of the pay-your-bid auction.
4: t← 0, S0 ← N .
5: while St 6= ∅ do
6: Tt ← any set in W({max(bi(.)− p¯i(t)i , 0)}) . needs a query call to WIN-ORAC.
7: St+1 ← St ∩ Tt
8: if St+1 6= ∅ then
9: Run procedure Core-Search({bi(.)}, pi(t), St+1) to return {pii}i∈N & {¯pii}i∈N .
10: pi(t+1)i ← ¯pii , i ∈ N .
11: p¯i(t+1)i ← p¯ii , i ∈ N
12: t ← t+ 1.
13: end if
14: end while
15: return pi(t)
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Algorithm 2 (Procedure Core-Search for water-filling algorithm)
1: parameters:  > 0.
2: input: submitted bids {bi(.)}i∈N , core point pi and subset of bidders S ⊆ N .
3: initialize: ∆l = 0 and ∆h = 1.
4: while ∆h −∆l > |S| do . do binary-search to find ∆l and ∆h.
5: ∆← ∆l+∆h2 .
6: Let p˜ii = pii + ∆ for i ∈ S, p˜ii = pii for i ∈ N \ S, and p˜i0 = w(N)−∑i∈N p˜ii.
7: if p˜i0 ≥ w (N, {max(bi(.)− p˜ii, 0)}) then . requires one query call to oracle WIN-ORAC.
8: ∆l ← ∆.
9: else ∆h ← ∆.
10: end if
11: end while
12: return {pii}i∈N , {¯pii}i∈N , where
{
pii = pii + ∆h and ¯
pii = pii + ∆l, if i ∈ S.
pii = pii and ¯
pii = pii, otherwise.
The iterations of the algorithm are indexed by t. The algorithm maintains a current core point
pi(t) (initially the origin) and a collection of active bidders, St, whose utilities can be increased
(initially all bidders). On each iteration, the algorithm updates the set of active bidders St by
finding and removing a set St \ Tt of bidders whose utilities cannot be increased without violating
a core constraint (Finding the next feasible set might take several iterations, without changing the
point pi(t), for reasons that will become clear in the proof). It then applies binary search along
the ray of points consisting of uniform increases to the utilities of all agents in St+1, described in
subroutine Core-Search. This finds a pair of points {
¯
pii} and {p¯ii}, where ¯pi is in the core, p¯i isoutside the core, and the points are within  of each other in `1 distance, i.e.
w(N)−
∑
i∈N ¯
pii , ¯
pi0 ≥ w (N, {max(bi(.)− ¯pii, 0)}) . feasible core point.
w(N)−
∑
i∈N
p¯ii , p¯i0 < w (N, {max(bi(.)− p¯ii, 0)}) . infeasible (out of core).∑
i∈N
p¯ii −
∑
i∈N ¯
pii ≤ 
The algorithm uses
¯
pi as its updated core point, and uses p¯i to update the set of active bidders in
the subsequent iteration, by finding the set of winners for sincere bids {max(bi(.)− p¯ii, 0)}, i.e. Tt+1.
Once all bidders are frozen, the algorithm returns the current core point. An illustration of each
iteration and how sets St and Tt are set at each iteration can be seen in Figure 1, which describes
simulating our algorithm on the example in (Day and Raghavan, 2007).
3.3 Proof of Correctness and Running Time
The main idea behind the proof of correctness of the algorithm is the following simple observation.
Suppose pi is a point in the core and S is a tight core constraint with respect to pi. Note that
there always exists at least one tight core constraint, as the constraint for coalition N is always
tight. Now, one is allowed to increase pii by a small amount and still have a core point as long as
bidder i is participating in every tight core constraint S ⊆ N . This is true because the change in
the left-hand side and right-hand of Equation 3 will be the same for all currently tight constraints,
which are the only candidates to get violated after the small change. Inspired by this observation,
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Figure 1: Water-filling algorithm for the following example in Day and Raghavan (2007). Letm = 2
items, A and B, n = 5 bidders, and let bids be as follow (each bidder submits one bid): b1(A) = 60,
b2(B) = 100, b3(AB) = 60, b4(A) = 20, and b5(B) = 20. The filled area is the core-polytope,
and the arrow shows the path that algorithm follows. Note that S0 = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, T0 = {1, 2},
S1 = {1, 2}, T1 = {2, 4}, S2 = {2}, T2 = {3} and S3 = ∅.
the water-filling algorithm starts from a point in the core and fills the utilities of nested subsets of
bidders uniformly at each iteration, until it ensures that there exists no bidder in the intersection
of all tight (and almost tight) core-constraints.
Given this observation, here is the intuition behind the correctness of the algorithm. As men-
tioned earlier, Algorithm 1 keeps track of {pi(t)i }i∈N (inside the core), and {p¯i(t)i }i∈N (outside of
the core), while these two points are always -close in `1-norm distance. As a result, they help
the algorithm to find the next subset of bidders St+1 ⊂ St, with the property that the algorithm
can potentially increase their corresponding utilities uniformly. Furthermore, for a fixed run of the
algorithm consider sequence ∅ = G0 ⊂ G1 ⊂ G2 ⊂, . . ., where Gt , {T1, . . . , Tt−1}. By closeness of
the two points, it can be shown that Gt is always a collection of -tight core constraints with respect
to pi(t). This sequence acts as a certificate of correctness for the algorithm: at each iteration t the
algorithm ensures that bidders in St+1 =
⋂t
t′=0 Tt are indeed the subset of bidders appearing in ev-
ery constraint of Gt+1, and hence those which could have increased their utility. So, at termination
it ensures that St+1 is empty, and therefore there exists no bidder that appears in all -tight core
constraints.
More concretely, we prove the correctness of the algorithm in two steps. We first show upon
termination the algorithm outputs a point in the core that is -bidder optimal, and then we show
that the algorithm terminates in at most |N | = n iterations. To do so, we start by proving the
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following lemma, which is crucial in understanding how our algorithm works.
Lemma 3.1. Fix a vector of utilities {pii}i∈N . Suppose S ⊆ N . The following are true:
• S is a maximum binding constraint if it is also the set of winning bidders for some maximum
welfare allocation under bids {max(bi(.)− pii, 0)}i∈N .
• Suppose we have ∀i ∈ S : pii > 0. Then S is a maximum binding constraint only if it is the set
of winning bidders for some maximum welfare allocation under bids {max(bi(.)− pii, 0)}i∈N .
Proof Suppose S′ be the set of winners for a maximum welfare allocation x′ under truncated bids
{max(bi(.)− pii, 0)}i∈N . Note for all i ∈ S′, bi(x′i) > pii (otherwise, allocation x′ gives items for free
to some bidder j, because x′j 6= ∅ & max(bj(x′j)− pij , 0) = 0 as bj(x′j) ≤ pij). Let S be a maximum
binding constraint and xS be the maximum welfare allocation restricted to bidders S. We have
w(S)−
∑
i∈S
pii =
∑
i∈S
(bi(xSi )− pii) ≤
∑
i∈N
max(bi(xSi )− pii, 0)
≤
∑
i∈N
max(bi(x′i)− pii, 0) =
∑
i∈S′
(bi(x′i)− pii) ≤ w(S′)−
∑
i∈S′
pii (5)
and therefore S′ is also a maximum binding constraint.
Next, suppose S is a maximum binding constraint. Let xS be the allocation that maximizes
the welfare restricted to bidders in S. Note that in such an allocation, all the bidders in S will be
winners, i.e. xSi 6= ∅ for i ∈ S (because otherwise there exists S′ ⊂ S such that w(S) = w(S′), and
therefore w(S)−∑i∈S pii < w(S′)−∑i∈S′ pii which is a contradiction). Now let x′ be a maximum
welfare allocation for truncated bids, and let S′ be the set of winners under such an allocation. We
have: ∑
i∈N
max(bi(x′i)− pii, 0) =
∑
i∈S′
(bi(x′i)− pii) ≤ w(S′)−
∑
i∈S′
pii ≤ w(S)−
∑
i∈S
pii
=
∑
i∈S
(bi(xSi )− pii) ≤
∑
i∈S
max(bi(xSi )− pii, 0)
=
∑
i∈N
max(bi(xSi )− pii, 0). (6)
Therefore xS is a maximum welfare allocation under {max(bi(.) − pii, 0)}i∈N , and S is its winner
set.
Now, using Lemma 3.1, we can prove the following invariants of our algorithm: pi(t) is a core
point for each t, and {Gt} is a collection of -tight core constraints with respect to pi(t).
Lemma 3.2. Given submitted bids {bi(.)}i∈N and  > 0, there exists a finite sequence of collections
∅ = G0 ⊂ G1 ⊂ . . . ⊂ GT+1, such that the following invariants hold at each iteration t of Algorithm 1:
(1) {pi(t)i }i∈N is always in the core, and {p¯i(t)i }i∈N is outside of the core for t ≥ 1.
(2) St is the subset of bidders that are simultaneously participating in all core constraints included
in the collection Gt , {T0, . . . , Tt−1}. Moreover, for t ≥ 1, St \ Tt 6= ∅ and Gt 6= Gt+1.
(3) Gt+1 is a collection of -tight core constraints with respect to pi(t) (as in Definition 2.5).
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Proof
Part (1): To prove this part, we use induction. For the base case t = 0, all-zero vector pi(0) is
always in the core as w(N) ≥ w(S) for all S ⊆ N . Now suppose pi(t−1) is in the core. If pi(t) = pi(t−1)
we are done. So let pi(t) 6= pi(t−1). As a result, pi(t) =
¯
pi in the binary search phase at iteration t− 1.
Therefore, due to termination condition of Core-Search subroutine, for all S ⊆ N we have:
w(N)−
∑
i∈N
pi
(t)
i = ¯
pi0 ≥ w
(
N, {max(bi(.)− pi(t)i , 0)}
)
≥ w(S)−
∑
i∈S
pi
(t)
i (7)
where the last inequity holds because of Lemma 3.1. So, pi(t) is a core point. Also, for t ≥ 1 the
point p¯i(t) is outside of the core, because once binary search stops at iteration t− 1 we have:
w(N)−
∑
i∈N
p¯i
(t)
i = p¯i0 < w
(
N, {max(bi(.)− p¯i(t)i , 0)}
)
= w(S)−
∑
i∈S
p¯i
(t)
i (8)
for some S ⊆ N .
Part (2): First of all, note that St is the subset of bidders that are simultaneously participating in
all of {Tt′}t−1t=1, simply because St =
⋂t−1
t′=0 Tt′ due to the update rule of St. Moreover, at iteration
t− 1 (for t ≥ 1) the algorithm starts from a feasible core point pi(t−1) and uniformly increases the
utilities only for bidders in St, until it reaches to a point p¯i(t) that is outside of the core. Note
that no constraint S ⊇ St will get violated during this process, simply because the changes in the
left hand side and right hand side of these constraints (refer to Definition 2.2 and Equation 3) are
equal, following the fact that St =
⋂t−1
t′=0 Tt′ . In particular, no constraint in Gt will get violated by
p¯i(t). At iteration t, Tt is set to one of the most binding core constraint with respect to p¯i(t) (due
to Lemma 3.1), and therefore it should be a violated core constraint, because p¯i(t) is outside of the
core. Combining the above arguments, St \ Tt 6= ∅. So, Tt /∈ Gt and therefore Gt 6= Gt+1.
Part (3): To prove this part, we again use induction. For the base case t = 1, G1 = {T0} is the set
of winning bidders of maximum welfare allocation under original bids {bi(.)}i∈N . Therefore, due
to Lemma 3.1, it is also a maximum binding constraint for all-zero vector pi(0). Moreover, coalition
N is always a tight core constraint (as in Definition 2.5), and therefore any maximum binding core
constraint is also a tight core constraint. Now suppose Gt = {T0, . . . , Tt−1} is a collection of -tight
core constraints with respect to pi(t−1). Note that if a constraint is -tight core constraint at some
iteration, it will always remain -tight, as utilities never decrease and pi(t) is also in the core. At
iteration t, pi(t) =
¯
pi and p¯i(t) = p¯i, where these parameters are set in binary search phase at the
previous iteration t − 1. Moreover, Tt will be a violated constraint under p¯i (as in the proof of
Part (2)). Therefore,
w(N)−
∑
i∈N
pi
(t)
i
(1)
≤ w(N)−
∑
i∈N
p¯i
(t)
i + 
(2)
< w(Tt)−
∑
i∈Tt
p¯ii + 
(3)
≤ w(Tt)−
∑
i∈Tt
pi
(t)
i +  (9)
where inequality (1) holds because ∑i∈N p¯ii − ∑i∈N ¯pii ≤ , inequality (2) holds because Ttis a violated core constraint for p¯i(t) = p¯i, and inequity (3) simply holds because for all i ∈ N ,
pi
(t)
i = ¯
pii ≤ p¯ii. So, Tt is also an -tight core constraint for pi(t), and therefore Gt+1 is a collection of
-tight core constraints with respect to pi(t).
Lemma 3.3. The Algorithm 1 terminates in at most |N | = n iterations.
Proof By using Lemma 3.2, Algorithm 1 terminates, as Gt 6= Gt+1 for t ≥ 1 and there are only
finitely many such collections. Moreover, following the fact that St \ Tt 6= ∅, one can conclude
St+1 ( St. S0 = N , and hence the algorithm terminates in at most |N | iterations.
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Proposition 3.4. Algorithm 1 returns an -bidder optimal core point. Moreover, it requiresO(n log(n/))
evaluations of the oracle WIN-ORAC and an additional time O(n2 log(n/)).
Proof Combining Lemma 3.2 and Lemma 3.3, after at most |N | = n iterations the algorithm
terminates. At termination time T , ST+1 = ∅ is the subset of bidders that are participating
simultaneously in all of the core constraints in the collection GT+1. Also, GT+1 is a collection of
-tight core constraints with respect to pi(T ). Combining those, we conclude that the intersection of
all -tight core constraints with respect to pi(T ) is empty. Now, pi(T ) is in the core and if you increase
one of its coordinates, lets say j, by more than  then we know there exists at least one -tight
core constraint S with respect to pi(T ) such that j /∈ S and therefore by this change this constraint
will be violated. So, by Definition 2.3, pi(T ) is -bidder optimal. Moreover, at each iteration t the
algorithm uses one query call to WIN-ORAC to find St+1, at most log( |St+1| ) query calls to do the
binary search, and at most |St+1| log( |St+1| ) extra additions during the binary search. So in total
it only needs
Total # of oracle calls ≤ n+
T∑
t=0
log
( |St+1|

)
≤ n+
n∑
t=1
log
(
t

)
= n+ log
(
n!
n
)
= O(n log(n/)).
Extra time needed ≤
T∑
t=0
|St+1| log
( |St+1|

)
≤
n∑
t=1
t log
(
t

)
= O(n2 log(n/)).
4 Discussion
In this section, we elaborate on the computational and fairness properties of our core-selecting
algorithm in comparison to existing payment rules in the literature.
Water-filling vs. VCG. VCG is a combinatorial auction in which reporting true values is a
dominant strategy equilibrium. Computing payments in this auction can be done with O(n) query
calls to a optimal welfare oracle.4 In comparison, our water-filling algorithm (Algorithm 1) induces
a truncated strategy (i.e. i ∈ N : bi(.) = max(vi(.) − pii, 0)) that is a full-information -Nash
equilibrium, as its payment rule is an -bidder optimal core payment Day and Raghavan (2007).
Moreover, as we showed in Theorem 3.4, computing payments only requires O˜(n) query calls to
truncated maximum welfare allocation oracle. Furthermore, our payments produce more revenue at
equilibrium 5 Day and Milgrom (2008) and no coalition (subset of all bidders) can form a mutually
beneficial renegotiation among themselves Day and Milgrom (2008).
Parametrizing the path and fairness. The choice of direction for water-filling at each iter-
ation t of Algorithm 1 is flexible, as long as it is only restricted to increasing utilities for bidders
in set St. Therefore it can potentially implement different core payment rules tailored for different
economical objectives. E.g., uniform water-filling will guarantee the approximate-equity of utilities
subject to being a bidder optimal core point. Another desired objective is fairness with respect to
4By relaxing the incentive constraints to hold in expectation, approximate VCG payments can be computed
implicitly by just one call to the allocation oracle in single dimensional Babaioff et al. (2010) or combinatorial Wilkens
and Sivan (2015) settings.
5To compare the revenue, one can consider the coalition N \ {i} and note that pii ≤ w(N)− w(N \ {i}), which is
indeed the VCG utility of player i. Therefore, total generated revenue is lower-bounded by the VCG revenue.
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Figure 2: VCG-Pursuit. In this variation of our water-filling algorithm at every iteration the
algorithm tries to move along a ray that connects the current point to the VCG point (which can
be outside of the core).
VCG (e.g. Day and Raghavan (2007) minimizes `1 distance to VCG, and Day and Cramton (2012)
minimizes `2 distance to VCG). For this objective, we can consider a variant of our algorithm that
at each iteration performs Core-Search along the ray that connects pi(t) to VCG (See Figure 2).
This VCG-pursuit heuristic finds a bidder optimal point that attempts to minimize the angle with
the ray connecting the origin with the VCG outcome, and therefore it heuristically implements an
equilibrium in which winning bidders receive (almost) the same fraction of their utilities in VCG.
5 Experiments on Ad Auction Data
In this section, we experimentally study our proposed core pricing algorithm, Algorithm 1, by
simulating it on ad auction bidding data. Our data is collected through the Microsoft Bing search
engine and its sponsored search auction platform. Using this dataset, we measure an estimate of the
revenue and running time of our proposed auction. We begin by describing the allocation problem
and bidding language for ad auctions. We then describe an optimal welfare algorithm that we can
use as an oracle under this model. Using all these ingredients, we then explain our experimental
results by comparing our core-selecting auction with standard ad-auction solutions such as GSP or
VCG.
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5.1 Sale of Space Problem
The problem of sale of space is as follows. Advertisers bid on search queries, called keywords. For
each keyword that an advertiser bids on, he provides a collection of basic ads and, potentially,
enhanced configurations (e.g., decorations that extend the size of an ad). When a user searches
for a keyword, a maximum amount of space to devote to ads is exogenously determined, and an
auction is used to determine which ads to show in that space. The auction also specifies a cost per
click (CPC) for each ad, which will be charged to the advertiser if a user clicks on an ad. The total
expected revenue is then estimated by an ad’s probability of click (pclick) times its CPC. These click
rates are modeled and estimated by the search platform. We make use of the Bing click prediction
estimates in our experiment. While we do not directly observe an advertiser’s true value for an
advertising assignment, we will estimate it as the probability of click, pclick, times the advertiser’s
bid on that ad, bi. In this sense, our experiments are applying allocation rules that maximize the
declared welfare of advertisers in our dataset. See Remark 5.3 for further discussion.
The goal is to determine which ads to show in the available space. This allocation is subject to
various constraints. In our experiments, the constraints we impose are that 1) each advertiser can
place at most one ad, 2) the total number of ads is bounded by a constant, and 3) the total number
of lines must not exceed the available space. In practice the platform may face other constraints
as well, such as measures of user and advertiser quality, but we omit these for simplicity. To
summarize, we have arrived at the following allocation problem:
Definition 5.1 (Allocation Problem). There is a slate of space, divided into m lines (i.e. single
lines of text) that potentially can be allocated to different advertisers. A feasible allocation provides
each advertiser with a consecutive block of lines. Each advertiser i has a set of possible ads Di with
different lengths, where for each ad she has a fixed bid bi, and probability of click pi(d) for each
particular decoration d ∈ Di. Lets assume the total number of ads is n. The problem is then to
select an ordered set of at most h ads, one ad per advertiser, so that the total number of lines is
no greater than m and the total generated welfare is maximized.
For such advertiser preferences, we note that the welfare-maximizing allocation can be computed
efficiently (in the number of ads n and the number of linesm) via dynamic programming, even when
valuations are truncated. Our dynamic program is listed as Algorithm 3. We assume (without loss)
that the n ads are indexed so that all ads from the same advertiser lie in a contiguous range. That
is, no ad of one advertiser comes between two ads from another advertiser. Then the subproblem
for our dynamic program is sub(i, h′,m′), which gives the optimal welfare while using ads from
index i to n, allocating at most h′ ads from distinct advertisers and using at most m′ lines. The
solution to the full allocation problem is then sub(1, h,m). We write l (adi) for the number of lines
for ad i and W (adi) = pi ∗ bi for the value of adi to its associated advertiser.
5.2 Our experiments
Our experiments are based on a dataset of 19, 996 auctions chosen uniformly at random from all
Bing online advertising auctions that ran on January 23th, 2018. The average number of different
ads participating in each auction is 107 and the average of number of different advertisers is 7.
Therefore, the average number of configurations per advertiser is approximately 15. The maximum
number of ads that can be allocated in each auction is at most 4. The maximum number of line
counts that can be assigned, however, is variable across auction instances.
We implemented and compared three different auctions: our proposed core-pricing in this paper
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Algorithm 3 (Dynamic Program)
1: input: ads {adi}i∈n, index I, number of ads to be allocated h′ and maximum number of
available lines m′.
2: initialize: bestWF← 0.
3: if I > n or h′ < 1 or m′ < 1 then
4: return 0
5: end if
6: for i = I to n do
7: Let j be next ad from different advertiser than i.
8:
9: if bestWF < W (adi) + sub (j, h′ − 1,m′ − l (adi)) then
10: bestWF←W (adi) + sub (j, h′ − 1,m′ − l (adi))
11: end if
12: end for
13: return bestWF
(CORE)6, Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auction (VCG), and Generalized Second Price auction (GSP). We
studied these auctions without reserve prices.7 We consider both an optimal GSP, that chooses
a welfare-optimal allocation, and a greedy GSP, which greedily allocates pclick times bids. Each
variant of GSP prices each ad according to the pclick times bid of the subsequent ad.8 Greedy GSP
has faster runtime, since it need not call a slate-optimization oracle, but has worse performance
relative to Optimal GSP.
In Table 1 we show the average revenue of the auction types, for different values of maximum
allowed line counts. This is equal to ∑i∈A bi ∗ CPCi, where A is the set of all assigned ads and bi
is the bid on ad i. Note that all the numbers are normalized by the average revenue of the VCG
auction. Table 1 shows that selecting a core outcome can significantly boost revenue compared to
VCG and even GSP, all without reserve prices. This experimental result suggests that having ads
with different decoration creates complementarity in valuations, in such a way that even a relatively
aggressive pricing method such as GSP leaves significant revenue on the table. We observe that
as the available space or total number of available ads increases, this phenomenon intensifies (see
Figure 3, and for more experiments see also Appendix A). 9
Table 2 shows the average running times in milliseconds, and Figure 4 shows how they change
as the number of ads increases. As we can see from the data, while our core pricing is slower than
GSP and VCG, it is still in an acceptable range for sponsored search auction of Bing.
Another factor we study is fairness to the advertisers. For a given auction, our notation of the
fairness is the ratio of the maximum utility to the minimum utility of the allocated advertisers,
i.e. maxi∈A pi(bi−CPCi)mini∈A pi(bi−CPCi) , where A is the set of all assigned ads. As discussed in Section 4, when
we uniformly increase utilities of all the advertisers in Algorithm 1, we tend to fairly divide the
extra surplus between eligible advertisers while not violating the core constraints. Note that a core
constraint, however, might cause a specific advertiser to pay a large amount compared to the VCG
6The code for our implementation is provided as supplementary materials.
7Tuned reserve prices are commonly used to boost revenue. However, as reserves can be applied to all three of
these auctions, we choose not to include them in this experiment in order to focus on the impact of the auction
pricing rule.
8The last ad will be priced by the best ad that was not assigned and can be fit within the line count limit.
9Due to Bing’s policy of protecting advertisers data, we are only allowed to report the normalized revenue, e.g.
normalized by VCG revenue with line count 10 for Table 1, or normalized by the smallest VCG revenue in the the
auction ensemble for Figure 3.
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Line count limit VCG GSP Core
10 1.00 1.25 1.96
15 1.10 1.54 2.37
20 1.14 1.72 2.32
25 1.16 1.86 2.42
30 1.17 1.97 2.50
35 1.18 2.05 2.45
Table 1: Average revenue per auction normalized by the revenue of VCG with Line count 10
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Figure 3: Normalized revenues versus total number of ads for line count=20.
prices, and hence caps the utility of this advertiser. Consequently, as you can see in Figure 5 (see
also Appendix A for more experiments), the core tends to lie between VCG and GSP in terms of
fairness.
5.3 Practical Considerations
Remark When using bidding data to evaluate our algorithms, we implicitly assumed truthful
bidding and took each advertiser’s bid as a proxy for their value. We made this choice in part due
to necessity. In online advertising settings, it is difficult to evaluate an advertiser’s true valuation
of a click. Indeed, the advertiser itself might not know the true valuations for the clicks received
from search engines, for several reasons. The quality of clicks differs and is dependent on the user,
publisher, and other context. Advertisers might not be utility maximizers (for example they might
be maximizing clicks given a budget), advertisers might value a conversion (a defined transaction
such as a sale or subscribing happens from the user after the click) or just a visit to their page.
Even if the appropriate metrics were known, the search platform typically does not get to observe
them accurately.
In addition to pure necessity, we also note that an actual implementation of a core auction
would take bids as values, and would choose a slate that maximizes declared welfare. Due to the
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Line count limit VCG GSP Core
10 2.36 0.72 12.57
15 6.71 1.64 35.22
20 10.24 2.53 54.46
25 13.01 3.18 68.16
30 14.14 3.72 78.20
35 16.65 3.97 86.56
Table 2: Running time in miliseconds
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Figure 4: Running times (in milliseconds) versus total number of ads for line count=20.
nice incentive properties of bidder-optimal core auctions (see Milgrom (2007)), one would expect
this to encourage advertisers to converge to using their true values as bids. Such a convergence
might take some time, however, as advertisers respond to the updated pricing rule. One could
therefore interpret our experimental results as evaluating the short-term impact of employing core
pricing, in advance of advertiser adjustments toward truthful bidding.
Remark We described a dynamic program for generating a welfare-optimal slate of ads, and
showed that it was feasible within the time constraints imposed by a production advertising platform
for a realistic number of ads and lines. However, if the number of advertisers or lines increases,
and/or there is a change on the assumptions that can be made on buyer utilities, it may turn out
that the dynamic programming solution is not always feasible in practice. If not, we note that one
can replace the optimal allocation with an approximate Maximal-In-Range allocation (see Dobzinski
and Nisan (2007)) and get the same result as in this paper, but for the core polytope restricted
to that range. In other words, if one can compute the optimal allocation within a restricted range
of allocations (e.g., those that allocate at most 4 ads, or that only show ads of the same size,
etc.), then our algorithm – using such a restricted welfare maximization oracle – will generate core
payments for the auction that restricts outcomes to lie in that range.
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Figure 5: Fairness ratios versus total number of ads for line count=20.
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A More experimental results for various line counts
We include more experiments with different line counts (20, 25 and 35) here for completeness.
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Figure 6: Normalized revenues versus total number of ads for line count=25.
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Figure 7: Normalized revenues versus total number of ads for line count=30.
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Figure 8: Normalized revenues versus total number of ads for line count=35.
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Figure 9: Running times (in milliseconds) versus total number of ads for line count=25.
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Figure 10: Running times (in milliseconds) versus total number of ads for line count=30.
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Figure 11: Running times (in milliseconds) versus total number of ads for line count=35.
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Figure 12: Fairness ratios versus total number of ads for line count=25.
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Figure 13: Fairness ratios versus total number of ads for line count=30.
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Figure 14: Fairness ratios versus total number of ads for line count=35.
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